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                                                              ABSTRACT 
While prior studies focus on real/accrual-based earnings management and expense 
misclassification to investigate earnings manipulation in avoiding covenant violations, this 
paper extends such research in a new direction. In particular, it examines whether firms employ 
classification shifting of revenues when they are subject to interest coverage EBITDA-based 
covenants close to their threshold values or limits. This earnings management tool allows firms 
to increase reported EBITDA by misclassifying non-operating revenues as operating revenues 
to remain within covenant limits that include EBITDA. Using a sample of 559 UK listed firm-
years for the period 2005-2014, it establishes that the use of classification shifting of revenues 
is high when interest coverage covenants are close to their limits. Further analysis suggests that 
firms also employ revenue shifting when all their loan covenants are EBITDA-related.  
Keywords: classification shifting of revenues; interest coverage covenant; debt covenant 
violations  
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1.  Introduction  
Banks impose conditions on loans via covenants to reduce agency costs. Violations of debt 
covenants give lenders the option of modifying the cost of debt, accelerating the loan 
repayment schedule, decreasing the availability of credit or restricting capital spending. The 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) debt covenant hypothesis states that firms with tight covenant 
slack1 have incentives to manage earnings to avoid these costly actions. To test this hypothesis, 
a stream of studies investigate whether firms that have tight covenant slack inflate earnings 
using real/accruals-based earnings manipulation and expense misclassification tools of 
earnings management (hereafter EM) (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Dichev and Skinner 
2002; Fan, Thomas, and Yu 2019; Franz, HassabElnaby, and Lobo 2014). They establish that 
firms with tight covenant slack employ these forms of EM.  
However, the results of extant studies do not provide a complete picture of managing 
earnings in the debt contracting setting. This is because, in addition to real/accruals-based EM 
and expense shifting, firms might employ other manipulation tools to remain within covenant 
limits. If such tools are available to management, then lenders and investors will not have a 
broad and comprehensive understanding of firms’ EM practices in the context of debt 
covenants. When management are considering undertaking EM they have to evaluate a number 
of factors, a significant one being the costs, both direct and indirect, of using a particular EM 
method. As there are potential high costs associated with using traditional real/accruals EM, 
this provides a motivation for management to consider if there are alternative less costly and 
feasible techniques that allow them to manage earnings. Collectively, these factors suggest that 
it is important to identify other possible manipulation methods that firms with tight covenant 
may use.  
                                                 
1 Tight covenant slack is defined as situations where a company is close to its covenant threshold value. 
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 This aim of this paper is to investigate an alternative EM tool - classification shifting of 
revenues – which has not previously been explored in the debt contracting setting. Specifically, 
it examines whether firms employ this type of manipulation tool when they have tight 
EBITDA-based covenant slack. Firms engage in classification shifting of revenues by 
misclassifying non-operating revenues as operating revenues (Malikov, Manson, and Coakley 
2018). This form of EM increases operating revenues and thereby EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) but it does not change net income. Therefore, 
using classification shifting of revenues may help firms to remain within EBITDA-based 
covenant limits.  
Classification shifting of revenues may be a preferable EM method to use by firms with 
tight EBITDA-based covenant slack as it enjoys several advantages compared to accruals-
based (real) EM and expense misclassification. First, unlike accruals-based (real) EM, revenue 
misclassification attracts less auditor scrutiny because it has no effect on the bottom line 
income. Where audit clients engage in manipulating their financial statements by violating 
GAAP (e.g. accruals EM) auditors might face reputational risk and litigation costs and 
therefore have greater incentives to object to these violations. Classification shifting of 
revenues also has no tax implications, no accruals that later reverse, and no negative future firm 
performance implications relative to real and accruals EM. For instance, firms using real EM 
make suboptimal operating decisions which are likely to place the firm in a less competitive 
situation in the future. Second, unlike expense misclassification, revenue shifting enables firms 
to simultaneously achieve more objectives. If firms with tight EBITDA-related covenant slack 
decide to employ revenue shifting, this will allow them not only to avoid covenant violations 
but also to meet earnings and sales revenue forecasts as well as to increase their market 
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valuation.2 All these objectives are unlikely to be achieved via expense shifting and 
furthermore, firms do not always have scope for employing a technique such as expense 
misclassification. This is because firms employ expense shifting when they have naturally 
occurring non-recurring expenses - income-decreasing special items – which may not occur 
every year (e.g. Fan, Barua, Cready, and Thomas 2010; McVay 2006).  
We examine whether firms employ classification shifting of revenues when they have tight 
EBITDA-based covenant slack in the context of the UK for several reasons. Firstly, bank debt 
is the main source of borrowing in the UK (Marshall, McCann, and McColgan 2019) where 
EBITDA-based covenants are the most commonly used covenants (e.g. Christensen, Lee, and 
Walker 2009; Moir and Sudarsanam 2007). For example, Christensen et al. (2009) document 
that the interest coverage (EBITDA-based) covenant is the most common one in the UK and is 
included in virtually all UK debt contracts. This offers scope for studying whether firms employ 
revenue shifting to remain within covenant limits. Secondly, the consolidated financial 
statements of UK companies have to be prepared in compliance with IFRSs. These standards 
provide scope for management to misclassify income statement line items (Malikov et al. 2018; 
Zalata and Roberts 2017). Particularly pertinent to this study is that IAS 18 - Revenue focused 
more on the measurement of revenue rather than its disclosure. Having such flexibility in terms 
of disclosure makes the UK an interesting setting for examining whether firms avoid covenant 
violations by using revenue shifting. Thirdly, the UK has a creditor-friendly bankruptcy code 
which means that default events result in the control rights over the borrowing firm being 
transferred to banks (Acharya, Sundaram, and John 2011). A covenant violation in the UK 
entitles the lending bank - and by extension all banks through cross-default clauses - to place 
                                                 
2 Ertimur, Livnat, and Martikainen (2003) and Marguardt and Wiedman (2004) show that investors value a dollar 
of operating revenues surprises greater than a dollar decrease in operating expenses.  
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that firm directly into receivership and liquidate its assets.3 This suggests that UK firms have 
strong incentives not to be in technical default which offers scope to examine whether they 
achieve this by engaging in classification shifting of revenues. 
Our empirical analysis uses company annual reports to identify UK firms with private debt 
covenants. Similar to prior studies, we find that the interest coverage EBITDA-based covenant 
is the most commonly used UK covenant and therefore this covenant is employed in our 
analysis. Using a sample of UK firms with interest coverage covenants over the period 2005-
2014, the results show that the use of classification shifting of revenues is high when the interest 
coverage covenant slack is tight. This supports the debt covenant hypothesis for this alternative 
form of EM. Further analysis suggests that firms also employ revenue shifting when all their 
loan covenants are EBITDA-related. This implies that misclassification of revenue items 
depends on the centrality of EBITDA as a performance metric in loan contracts. Overall, the 
results suggest that the level of the interest coverage covenant slack provides the motivation 
for firms to engage in classification shifting of revenues. 
This study contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it extends the debt covenant 
hypothesis literature by providing evidence that firms with tight covenant slack employ not 
only real/accrual-based EM or expense misclassification (e.g. Fan et al. 2019; Franz et al. 2014) 
but also classification shifting of revenues. The results suggest that the latter is an important 
EM technique used to remain within covenant limits. It provides new insights into firms’ EM 
practices in the context of debt covenants. The results can help inform lenders of the need to 
monitor the company’s revenue stream and of including an appropriate definition of revenue 
within any loan agreement. Our study underlines the need for a tighter definition of revenue 
                                                 
3 This is not the case in all countries. For example, the USA has a debtor-friendly bankruptcy code which means 
that banks in the USA cannot place firms directly into liquidation if the firms file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection (Acharya et al. 2011; Li, Lou, and Vasvari 2015). The latter gives firms 120 days to recapitalize and 
potentially find a solution to their financial difficulties.  
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and thereby provides some justification for the issue of IFRS 15, Revenue from Contracts with 
Customers, by the IASB. 
Second, it extends the classification shifting of revenues literature by providing evidence 
that having tight EBITDA-related covenant slack in place is one motivation for firms to 
misclassify revenue items. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to document these results. 
Prior studies provide evidence that firms show non-operating revenues such as transitory gains 
as part of operating activities but they do not examine why firms engage in misclassification 
of revenue items with the exception of Hsu and Kross (2011). They document that firms show 
transitory gains as part of operating revenues to meet/beat zero operating profit or prior period 
operating profit. However, this is just one motivation for misclassifying revenue items and 
therefore it is important to examine other incentives behind this EM form. In this sense, our 
results are important as they add to our understanding of revenue misclassification by showing 
that credit market incentives motivate firms to employ the technique.  
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the 
main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample selection and the research design. Section 4 
analyses the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
2.1. Literature review 
The debt covenant hypothesis has been mainly tested using real/accruals-based EM forms of 
manipulation in the USA. Sweeney (1994) finds that firms are more likely to use accruals 
management when they are approaching violations of debt covenants. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) document that accruals EM is positive in the year prior to violation. In terms of the year 
of violation, they find the use of such EM tools only after controlling for management changes 
and auditor going concern qualifications. Franz et al. (2014) extend these studies by examining 
whether firms with tight covenant slack use real EM in addition to accruals management. They 
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find for a sample of US Dealscan firms with a tight covenant slack for the current ratio covenant 
employ real EM.4 The recent study by Fan et al. (2019) documents that firms with tight 
EBITDA-based covenant slack also employ expense misclassification.  
Prior UK studies analyse which accounting and other debt-based covenants are used in 
bank debt contracts but do not formally or directly test the debt covenant hypothesis. Citron 
(1992) investigates the types of accounting-based covenants using 25 UK bank loan contracts 
and 13 contract templates. He finds that interest coverage, net worth and gearing are the most 
frequently used accounting-based covenants. Day and Taylor (1996) interview 44 major UK 
corporate treasurers and obtain findings that are consistent with Citron (1992). Chatterjee 
(2006) investigates performance pricing in debt contracts using a sample of 64 firms. He 
documents that interest coverage and debt to EBITDA are the dominant debt covenants in UK 
debt contracting. Moir and Sudarsanam (2007) in a survey of private debt contracts based on 
72 large non-financial UK companies report that interest coverage is the most frequently 
occurring debt covenant, in line with the more recent study by Christensen et al. (2009). 
Overall, the literature affirms that the interest coverage EBITDA-based covenant is the most 
widely used covenant in UK debt contracting (e.g. Taylor 2013). 
In sum, prior studies mainly focus оn costly manipulation methods, real/accruals-based 
EM, to examine the debt covenant hypothesis. However, firms may have scope to use other 
EM methods which are not as costly as real/accruals-based EM and therefore the results of 
existing studies may not provide a comprehensive picture of firms’ manipulation practices in 
the debt contracting setting. In this sense, it is important to identify other possible manipulation 
methods that firms may employ to remain within covenant limits. In this paper, we focus on 
one form of EM - classification shifting of revenues – to examine whether firms use it to avoid 
breaching the interest coverage covenants. The classification shifting of revenues literature 
                                                 
4 Similar results are found by Kim, Lisic, and Pevzner (2010) who employ net worth covenants.  
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provides evidence that firms misclassify revenue items but they do not examine why firms 
engage in such misclassifications.5 Investigating the proposed research question allows us to 
determine the motivations behind using this manipulation method.  
2.2. Hypothesis development 
Extant studies show that covenant violations increase the cost of debt, accelerate the loan 
repayment schedule, decrease the availability of credit (Roberts and Sufi 2009), restrict capital 
spending (Chava and Roberts 2008), lead to legal actions, reduce shareholder payouts, and 
increase CEO turnover (Nini, Smith, and Sufi 2012). A covenant violation is especially costly 
in countries like the UK where banks have rights to liquidate firms’ assets that violate their 
debt covenants (Davydenko and Franks 2008; Deakin, Mollica, and Sarkar 2017). Firms might 
employ several options in seeking to avoid these costs. One option is that they may renegotiate 
their covenants before actually breaching them. They, however, may not be successful using 
this option because creditors exercise their control rights in a state-contingent manner. For 
instance, creditors may have little incentive to relax EBITDA-based covenant limits if they do 
not believe that the borrower is likely to improve its profitability in the future (Denis and Wang 
2014). In support of these arguments, Godlewski (2015) shows that debt renegotiations are not 
common in the UK.  
Therefore, firms might resort to other options such as managing earnings to avoid 
EBITDA-based covenant violations. They are likely to make a decision on whether to use this 
option by comparing the costs of violation versus the costs of engaging in EM. Extant studies 
suggest that managers appear to find covenant violations more costly than EM (e.g. Franz et 
al. 2014; Kim et al. 2010). The extent of EM is likely to depend on whether the accounting 
market where the firm is operating is strictly regulated. For example, the UK accounting market 
                                                 
5 One exception for this is the study by Hsu and Kross (2011) who provide evidence that one motivation for 
showing non-operating revenues, transitory gains, as part of operating revenues is to meet/beat operating earnings 
benchmarks.  
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is not strictly regulated because it does not have regulatory organizations like the SEC 
(Securities and Exchange Commission) in the USA that issues cautions to warn investors about 
potential manipulation tools whereas in the UK, the primary regulator is the Financial 
Reporting Council which through its conduct committee reviews corporate financial statements 
mainly to ensure they are in compliance with the law. Furthermore, extant studies suggest that 
UK firms are subject to considerably lower litigation risk than their US counterparts 
(Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn 2002; Zalata and Roberts 2016). Collectively, the above 
arguments suggest that a covenant violation is more costly than managing earnings particularly 
in countries like the UK and thus firms have incentives to employ EM to remain within interest 
coverage EBITDA-based covenant limits.  
Firms are likely to use those manipulation methods that help them avoid infringing an 
EBITDA-based covenant. Classification shifting of revenues might be one such EM tool that 
is employed to avoid debt covenant violations. This is because it enables firms to improve 
EBITDA by misclassifying non-operating revenues as operating revenues and thereby 
potentially remain within covenant limits. The debt contractual definitions of EBITDA, in 
general, do not include revenues from non-operating activities. For example, Li (2016) finds 
that the contractual definitions of EBITDA-based debt covenants usually exclude gains from 
special items. Appendix 1 provides the illustrative format of the income statement. It shows 
that EBITDA includes revenues from operating activities but not from non-operating activities.  
We, therefore, expect that firms with tight interest coverage EBITDA-based covenant 
slack are likely to employ revenue shifting to avoid covenant violations. This form of EM has 
no accruals that later reverse and no negative future firm performance implications unlike 
accruals and real EM, respectively. Furthermore, classification shifting of revenues allows 
firms to inflate operating profit via increasing sales and decreasing non-operating revenues 
unlike other EM techniques (e.g. expense misclassification). This is important as firms have 
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incentives to decrease non-recurring gains and to increase operating revenues to influence 
investors’ perceptions by providing a signal that their revenues are mainly based on recurring 
operations (e.g. Marguardt and Wiedman 2004; Weiss 2001).  
The following overarching hypothesis (stated in alternative form) follows from the above 
discussion: 
Hypothesis: Firms engage in classification shifting of revenues when they have tight 
interest coverage covenant slack.  
3.  Sample selection and research design 
3.1.   Sample selection  
We start the sample selection with all UK (dead and alive)6 listed firms in Compustat Global 
for the period between 2005 and 2014. The sample period begins in 2005 as UK listed firms 
were required to follow IFRS from 2005.7 Following extant studies, financial and utility firms 
are excluded as the former have a different financial reporting environment and the latter have 
more predictable earnings growth. Furthermore, firm-year observations are excluded for which 
the data is not available to calculate EM measures. This yields a sample of 5,827 firm-year 
observations, capturing 1,124 firms. To obtain covenant information, we manually check all 
these 1,124 firms’ annual reports during our sample period. Consequently, we find 1,272 firm-
year observations with debt covenants, comprising 302 firms.  
                                               [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 shows the summary of covenant restrictions for our sample firm-years. We find 
that the interest coverage EBITDA-based covenant is the most frequently used covenant and is 
included in virtually all UK debt contracts as 1,129 firm-years out of 1,272 include such type 
                                                 
6 Dead firms are included across the test period to avoid survivorship bias. 
7 Note, UK firms quoted on the Alternative Investment Market were required to follow IFRS from 2007. 
Therefore, for these firms, our sample period begins in 2007.  
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of covenant. This is in line with extant UK studies (Moir and Sudarsanam 2007; Christensen 
et al. 2009). Thus, we employ the interest coverage EBITDA-based covenant in our main 
analysis. Our final sample with interest coverage covenants consists of 559 firm-years, 
covering 126 firms since we lose 570 firm-years8 with interest coverage covenants due to 
threshold values not being stated in the annual report. 
3.2.   Interest coverage covenant slack 
Following Franz et al. (2014), we measure interest coverage covenant slack as follows: 
         _	, =
, ,
,
                                                                                                            (1) 
where Actuali,t is the actual value of the interest coverage covenant for firm i in year t; 
Thresholdi,t is the threshold value of the interest coverage covenant. The actual value of the 
interest coverage covenant is calculated using the standard definition specified by Demerjian 
and Owens (2016) as EBITDA divided by interest expense.  
The measurement of covenant slack may be subject to measurement error (Beatty, Weber, 
and Yu 2008; Rhodes 2016). This is because some lenders may adjust GAAP numbers when 
they define debt covenant thresholds. Thus, the definition of interest coverage may vary across 
different borrowers and debt contracts. We mitigate this measurement error by defining firms 
that have interest coverage covenant slack within the bottom tercile9 of the full sample as those 
with tight covenant slack while all other firms are defined as having loose slack in the spirit of 
Rhodes (2016). 
3.3. Measuring classification shifting of revenues   
                                                 
8 While annual reports highlight that these firms are subject to interest coverage covenants, they do not reveal 
their threshold values.   
9 Our results do not change if we define tight covenant slack as firms that have interest coverage covenant slack 
within the lower quartile.   
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We follow Malikov et al. (2018) in measuring classification shifting of revenues. They posit 
that unexpected operating revenues (reported operating revenues (sales and other operating 
revenues) less expected operating revenues) in year t increase as non-operating revenues in 
year t decrease if managers use classification shifting of revenues. We employ the following 
model proposed by Malikov et al. (2018) to estimate the expected level of operating revenues:  
,
,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where ORi,t is operating revenues for firm i in year t, defined as the sum of sales revenue and 
other operating revenues; MTBi,t-1 is the market to book ratio; ATi,t-1 is total assets; ARi,t is 
accounts receivable.  
The model includes lagged operating revenues (ORi,t-1) since operating revenues tend to 
be persistent. Lagged market-to-book ratio (MTBi,t-1) is included to control for growth 
opportunities because lagged operating revenues are likely to be a noisy proxy for predicting 
high growth firms’ future operating revenues. Since past accruals negatively affect future 
earnings performance (e.g. McVay 2006; Sloan 1996), lagged accounts receivable (ARi,t-1) are 
included to capture the information content of prior-year accounts receivable for current-period 
revenues. Current accounts receivable (ARi,t) controls for extreme operating performance 
because unusually high operating revenues are likely to be associated with a large increase in 
accounts receivable. Finally, a scaled intercept is added to avoid a spurious correlation between 
scaled accounts receivable and operating revenues due to the variation in the scaling variable, 
total assets.   
Equation (2) is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year to control for 
macroeconomic and industry shocks.10 Unexpected operating revenues are defined as the 
                                                 
10 We estimate the model cross-sectionally for each industry-year using all UK firms included in Compustat 
Global. We employ the Global Industry Classification Scheme and require, following Athanasakou, Strong, and 
Walker (2009), at least 6 observations per industry-year to ensure that we have sufficient data for the estimation 
of classification shifting of revenues EM measure.  
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difference between reported and expected operating revenues, where the latter are estimated 
using the coefficients from model (2).11 
3.4. Regression model 
Our hypothesis predicts that firms engage in classification shifting of revenues when they have 
tight interest coverage covenant slack. To test this, we use the following regression equation: 
   UE_ORi,t  =  ! +  $NORi,t  +  %TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t +  'NORi,t × TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t +  +A_CFOi,t  + 
 ,NORi,t × A_CFOi,t  +  /A_DISXi,t  +  0NORi,t × A_DISXi,t +  1A_PRODi,t  +  2NORi,t × 
A_PRODi,t +  $!A_WCAi,t  +  $$NORi,t × A_WCAi,t +  $%CSi,t  +  $'NORi,t × CSi,t + 
 $+DISTi,t-1  +  $,NORi,t × DISTi,t-1 +  $/LOSSi,t  +  $0NORi,t × LOSSi,t +  $1SIZEi,t  + 
 $2NORi,t × SIZEi,t + 3i,t                                                                                                                                                                     (3) 
In the model, UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues for firm i in year t. NORi,t is non-
operating revenues, calculated as foreign exchange gains plus income-increasing special items 
and discontinued operations plus interest and related income plus other non-operating income 
including rental income divided by lagged total assets. The regression of UE_ORi,t on NORi,t 
provides the basis for testing classification shifting of revenues. TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t is our 
test variable that is equal to one for firms with tight interest coverage covenant slack, and zero 
otherwise. The interaction of NORi,t with TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t shows the effect of tight interest 
coverage covenant slack on classification shifting of revenues. Our hypothesis predicts a 
negative coefficient on NORi,t × TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t in regression (3).   
The model includes several control variables. First, we control for firms’ other EM 
practices using the following variables: A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from 
operations. A_ DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses. A_ PRODi,t is abnormal 
levels of production costs. A_WCAi,t is abnormal levels of working capital accruals. CSi,t is 
                                                 
11 In other words, unexpected operating revenues are measured as the residuals from the regression model in 
equation (2).  
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equal to one for firms that have positive unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing 
special items, and zero otherwise. A_CFOi,t,  A_ DISXi,t and A_ PRODi,t  are the measures of 
real EM (Roychowdhury 2006), A_WCAi,t is the measure of accruals EM
12 (Dechow and 
Dichev 2002), and CSi,t is the proxy of classification shifting of expenses (Joo and Chamberlain 
2017) (see Appendix 2 for the detailed explanations of how other EM measures are estimated). 
These variables are included as main effects and as interactions with NORi,t because the use of 
classification shifting of revenues may be affected by other types of EM tools. Abernathy, 
Beyer, and Rapley (2014), Fan et al. (2010), and Zang (2012) find that when firms increase 
using one type of EM they decrease using the other ones while Fan and Liu (2017) document 
some evidence that firms employ EM tools simultaneously. Moreover, since prior studies show 
the existence of accruals/real EM and expense misclassification, controlling for these methods 
of EM ensures that our results are due to revenue misclassification.  
Second, we control for firm characteristics using the following variables: DISTi,t-1 reflects 
the value of the Taffler (1983) Z-score, with lower values showing a higher probability of 
default. Prior studies show that the use of EM increases as the probability of default becomes 
higher (Butler, Leone, and Willenborg 2004; Jacoby, Li, and Liu 2019; Nagar and Sen 2016; 
Walker 2013). Therefore, DISTi,t-1 and its interaction with NORi,t are added to ensure that our 
results are due to engaging in revenue shifting to avoid covenant violations and not to firms 
suffering financial distress. We include a dummy variable for firms that report a loss (LOSSi,t) 
as well as its interaction with NORi,t as operating revenues rather than earnings are value 
relevant for firms reporting losses (Callen, Robb, and Segal 2008; Kama 2004) and thus they 
are likely to employ revenue shifting to overestimate operating revenues. Large firms are more 
likely to have revenues from non-operating activities which offer them greater opportunity to 
                                                 
12 The results do not change if we employ other measures of accruals EM such as total discretionary accruals (e.g. 
Peasnell, Pope, and Young 2000; Peasnell, Pope, and Young 2005). 
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engage in revenue misclassification. Alternatively, such firms may not employ classification 
shifting of revenues because the political cost hypothesis states that large firms are subject to 
extensive government scrutiny (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). As such, we control for large 
firms’ classification shifting of revenues practices by adding a dummy variable, SIZEi,t, that is 
equal to one for firms that have a natural logarithm of sales revenue within the top tercile of 
the full sample and zero otherwise, and its interaction with NORi,t. Finally, year dummies are 
included to control for timing effects. We use standard errors clustered by firm to control for 
time-series dependence in our panel model following Petersen (2009).  
4.  Empirical results  
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2, Panels A and B indicate the descriptive statistics for the main variables of the full 
sample and the firms with tight and loose interest coverage covenant slack, respectively. Panel 
A indicates that the median (mean) value of the interest coverage covenant threshold (IC_COV) 
is 3.5 (3.443). The interest coverage covenant slack (IC_SLACK) has a median value of 1.778. 
The corresponding mean exceeds its median implying that it is right skewed. The median 
(mean) of unexpected operating revenues (UE_OR) is -0.006 (-0.002) and the median (mean) 
of non-operating revenues (NOR) is 0.003 (0.013). Panel B shows that the median (mean) of 
the interest coverage covenant slack, as expected, is significantly lower for firms with tight 
covenant slack relative to their counterparts with loose covenant slack. Firms with tight 
covenant slack have significantly larger median (mean) non-operating revenues and lower 
median (mean) unexpected operating revenues than their counterparts with loose covenant 
slack. Regarding real/accruals EM and expense misclassification measures, we find that firms 
with tight covenant slack have significantly lower median (mean) abnormal levels of cash flows 
from operations (A_CFO) and larger abnormal levels of production costs (A_PROD) relative 
to firms with loose covenant slack. The results suggest that firms with tight covenant slack use 
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more real EM given that firms with abnormally high production costs or with abnormally low 
cash flows from operations are regarded as engaging in real activities manipulation (e.g. Gunny 
2010; Roychowdhury 2006). This supports extant studies that examine the debt covenant 
hypothesis employing real EM in the context of US firms (e.g. Franz et al. 2014). 
                                                       [Insert Table 2 about here]   
Table 3 displays Pearson correlation coefficients for the main variables. We observe that 
there is a significant and negative correlation between unexpected operating revenues (UE_OR) 
and non-operating revenues (NOR). Other significant correlations include those between 
abnormal levels of cash flows from operations (A_CFO) (abnormal levels of discretionary 
expenses (A_DISX)) and abnormal levels of production costs (A_PROD), in line with the 
corresponding correlations reported in existing studies (e.g. Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012). 
The results indicate that when abnormal levels of production costs increase abnormal levels of 
cash flows from operations (discretionary expenses) decrease.    
                                                        [Insert Table 3 about here]   
4.2. Interest coverage EBITDA-related covenant measure 
Table 4 provides regression results for testing whether firms engage in classification shifting 
of revenues when they have tight interest coverage covenant slack. The table shows that the 
NOR × TIGHT_IC_SLACK coefficient is significantly negative for unexpected operating 
revenues. This indicates that firms employ classification shifting of revenues when they have 
tight interest coverage covenant slack. The coefficient for NOR is -0.771 and that on NOR × 
TIGHT_IC_SLACK is -1.270 and both coefficients are significant. Thus, the overall effect of 
non-operating revenues for firms with tight interest coverage covenant slack is -2.041 (-0.771-
1.270; p=0.002). This suggests that when borrowers are close to violating an interest coverage 
covenant their managers engage to a larger extent in classification shifting of revenues which 
supports our hypothesis.  
16 
 
                                                          [Table 4 around here] 
4.3. Other EBITDA-related covenant measures 
We also investigate the effect of other EBITDA-related covenant measures on revenue 
misclassification. To do so, we first examine whether firms use classification shifting of 
revenues when all their loan covenants are EBITDA-related. One can argue that EBITDA 
particularly becomes a more important performance metric in loan contracts when all firms’ 
covenants are EBITDA-related rather than being a mixture of both EBITDA- and non-
EBITDA-based covenants. Inflating EBITDA via revenue shifting can allow firms with 
EBITDA-related covenants to remain within all their covenant limits unlike their counterparts 
with both EBITDA- and non-EBITDA-based covenants. The implication is that firms are more 
likely to employ misclassification of revenue items when all their loan covenants are EBITDA-
related.  
Furthermore, undertaking this further analysis enables us to consider all UK listed firms 
with covenants details as it does not require the availability of threshold values. Consequently, 
this analysis increases our sample size from 559 firm-years (126 unique firms) to 1,272 firm-
years (302 unique firms). We use the following variable to test revenue shifting practices of 
firms with only EBITDA-related covenants. EBITDA_ALL is equal to one for firms that have 
all their loan covenants EBITDA-related13, and zero otherwise.14 We replace the tight interest 
coverage covenant slack (TIGHT_IC_SLACK) variable with EBITDA_ALL in regression (3) 
and rerun it. Table 5, column (1) shows that the coefficient on NOR is significantly positive 
(0.922) but that on NOR × EBITDA_ALL is significantly negative (-1.566), giving a net 
coefficient of -0.644 (0.922-1.566; p=0.081) on NOR for firms with only EBITDA-related 
                                                 
13 The following covenants are regarded as EBITDA-related covenants: 1) interest coverage, 2) debt to EBITDA, 
3) fixed charge coverage, 4) debt service coverage, 5) EBITDA, and 6) EBITDA to net debt. In our sample, 842 
firm-year observations out of 1,272 have only EBITDA-related covenants.  
14 The results do not change if we use a continuous variable that is defined as the number of EBITDA-related 
covenants divided by the number of all financial covenants that a firm has in a specific year.  
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covenants. The results suggest that borrowers employ revenue shifting when they have only 
EBITDA-related covenants in their loan contracts. 
                                                     [Table 5 around here] 
Second, we examine the effect of tight debt to EBITDA covenant slack on classification 
shifting of revenues. Table 1 shows that the debt to EBITDA covenant in the UK is the second 
most frequently used covenant after the interest coverage.15 Therefore, it would be interesting 
to test whether firms also engage in revenue misclassification when they have tight debt to 
EBITDA covenant slack. To test this, we create an indicator variable, TIGHT_DE_SLACK, 
that is equal to one for firms that have tight debt to EBITDA covenant slack and zero otherwise, 
and use it to replace TIGHT_IC_SLACK in regression (3). We define firms with tight debt to 
EBITDA covenant slack as those in the bottom tercile along similar lines to tight interest 
coverage covenant slack. Table 5, column (2) indicates that while the coefficient on NOR is 
positive (0.037) but insignificant, the coefficient on NOR × TIGHT_DE_SLACK is 
significantly negative (-1.256), yielding a significantly negative overall coefficient on NOR for 
firms with tight debt to EBITDA covenant slack (0.037-1.256= -1.219; p=0.040). This implies 
that firms employ revenue shifting when they have tight debt to EBITDA covenant slack. 
Overall, these and the previous results suggest that, when borrowers are close to violating 
EBITDA-related covenants, managers engage in classification shifting of revenues. 
4.4. Robustness tests  
4.4.1. Controlling for corporate governance  
Prior studies provide evidence that the use of earnings management depends on the strength of 
corporate governance (e.g. Klein 2002; Lin and Hwang 2010; Zalata and Roberts 2016). They 
find that audit committee size and audit committee independence as well as board 
                                                 
15 As can be seen in Table 1, the use of other covenants is not really common in the UK and therefore we do not 
consider them.   
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independence curb manipulation methods such as accruals EM and expense misclassification. 
It is possible that corporate governance may also affect classification shifting of revenues 
which in turn may drive our main results. To control for this, we use the following two variables 
for which data are hand collected from the annual reports. AUDC is equal to one if the size of 
the audit committee is greater than the sample median and all directors on the audit committee 
are independent, and zero otherwise. BIND is equal to one if the percentage of independent 
board members is more than the sample median, and zero otherwise. We add these variables 
as main effects and as interactions with non-operating revenues to regression (3) and rerun it. 
Table 6 shows that the coefficient for NOR is significantly negative (-0.827) but that on NOR 
× AUDC is significantly positive (1.384). The implication is that firms with a strong audit 
committee do not employ revenue shifting as the overall coefficient on NOR for firms with 
large audit committees where all directors are independent is 0.557 (-0.827+1.384; p=0.445). 
The coefficient оn NOR × BIND is insignificant, implying that board independence does not 
affect classification shifting of revenues. More importantly, we find that the coefficient on NOR 
× TIGHT_IC_SLACK is significantly negative (-1.745), giving a net coefficient of -2.572 (-
0.827-1.745; p=0.000) on NOR for firms with tight interest coverage covenant slack. These 
findings suggest that our main results are robust to controlling for corporate governance.   
                                                  [Table 6 around here] 
4.4.2. Excluding financial crisis period  
Existing studies provide inconclusive results on the use of earnings management during the 
financial crisis period (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin 2007; Kousenidis, Ladas, and Negakis 2013). 
Moreover, debt contract designs during this time might have different features (Demerjian 
2011). As our sample spans the recent financial crisis period (2008-2009 (Beccalli, Bozzolan, 
Menini, and Molyneux 2015)), the primary results might not be based on a homogenous 
sample. We, therefore, exclude the crisis period from our sample and rerun the main analysis. 
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Table 7 indicates that while the coefficient on NOR is negative (-0.932) but insignificant, the 
coefficient on NOR × TIGHT_IC_SLACK is significantly negative (-1.704), yielding a 
significantly negative overall coefficient on NOR for firms with tight interest coverage 
covenant slack (-0.932-1.704 = -2.636; p=0.001). These results suggest that firms employ 
classification shifting of revenues when they have tight interest coverage covenant slack, 
consistent with our primary findings.   
                                                     [Table 7 around here]  
4.4.3. Alternative measures of unexpected operating revenues 
The main analysis measures unexpected operating revenues using the model proposed by 
Malikov et al. (2018). They include current-year accounts receivable in their model to control 
for extreme operating performance. On one hand, the inclusion of this variable is important 
because it includes receivables both from sale revenues and from other operating revenues. On 
the other hand, the inclusion of accounts receivable may affect the association between non-
operating revenues and unexpected operating revenues since it may also include receivables 
from non-operating revenues. Furthermore, their model includes lagged accounts receivable to 
control for the effect of past receivables on future earnings performance. However, it can be 
argued that they may affect future cash flows rather than future operating revenues. Thus, we 
examine the validity of our primary results by using two alternative measures of unexpected 
operating revenues. Under the first alternative measure, unexpected operating revenues are 
estimated by replacing lagged and current-year accounts receivable with lagged and current-
year trade receivables in model (2). This is because trade receivables do not include receivables 
from non-operating revenues. Under the second alternative measure, unexpected operating 
revenues are estimated by including only current-year trade receivables instead of lagged and 
current-year accounts receivable in model (2) since past receivables may not affect future 
operating revenues. We rerun our main analysis using these two alternative measures of 
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unexpected operating revenues. The results (not tabulated) suggest that our main findings are 
not sensitive to the alternative measures of unexpected operating revenues.  
5.  Conclusion  
This paper examines whether firms engage in classification shifting of revenues when they 
have tight EBITDA-based covenant slack. Prior studies have examined this issue by using 
real/accruals-based earnings management and expense misclassification tools of earnings 
manipulation. Classification shifting of revenues is a form of earnings manipulation where 
operating revenues and thereby EBITDA are increased. Therefore, using classification shifting 
of revenues may help firms to remain within EBITDA-based covenant limits.  
Our empirical analysis uses company annual reports to identify UK firms with private debt 
covenants for the 2005-2014 time period. We find that the interest coverage EBITDA-based 
covenant is the most commonly employed UK covenant and thus this covenant is used in our 
analysis. The results show that the use of classification shifting of revenues is high when 
interest coverage covenant slack is tight, in line with the debt covenant hypothesis for 
classification shifting of revenues. Further analysis reveals that firms also engage in revenue 
shifting when all their loan covenants are EBITDA-related. This suggests that misclassification 
of revenue items depends on how central EBITDA is as a performance metric in loan contracts. 
Overall, the results provide new insights into firms’ earnings manipulation practices in the 
context of debt covenants by showing that firms with tight covenant slack employ not only 
real/accrual-based earnings management or expense misclassification (e.g. Fan et al. 2019; 
Franz et al. 2014) but also classification shifting of revenues.  
The findings of this paper have important implications for capital providers. They suggest 
that lenders and investors need to have an awareness of the possibility of a firm inflating 
operating revenues via classification shifting when it is subject to EBITDA-based covenants 
close to their threshold values or limits. This implies that lenders need not only to monitor the 
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company’s traditional real/accruals earnings management but also to monitor its revenue 
stream and to include an appropriate definition of revenue within any loan agreement. The 
paper underlines the need for a tighter definition of revenue and thereby provides some 
justification for the issue of IFRS 15, Revenue from Contracts with Customers, by the IASB.  
The results of this paper also provide evidence that the Financial Reporting Council perhaps, 
needs to follow the SEC in the US and adopt a more aggressive approach in penalising 
companies that engage in earnings management (Evans, Houston, Peters, and Pratt 2015). 
Consequently, our results can help lenders, investors and regulators to have a broad and 
comprehensive understanding of firms’ earnings management practices in the context of debt 
covenants.  
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                                                                                     Table 1 
                                                          Summary of debt covenant restrictions 
  Covenants           Firm-year observations        Number of firms 
  Interest Coverage 1,129 263 
  Debt to EBITDA 952 226 
  Net Worth 122 42 
  Fixed Charge Coverage 114 35 
  Cash Flow Coverage 87 37 
  Debt to Equity   76 27 
  Cash Flow to Debt Service  72 30 
  Tangible Net Worth  72 20 
  Debt Service Coverage   61 20 
  EBITDA 46 20 
  Cash Balance 41 18 
  Loan to Value    22 6 
  Trade Receivables Cover  20 9 
  Net Debt 15 6 
  Profit 15 5 
  Debt to Tangible Net Worth  9 3 
  Sales Level 7 4 
  Current Ratio  5 3 
  Debt to Fair Value  5 1 
  Senior Notes  5 1 
  EBITDA to Net Debt 4 3 
  Trade Receivables to Net Debt 2 2 
Notes     
This table reports the summary of debt covenant restrictions (sample period: 2005-2014) in the UK    
obtained from the company annual reports.   
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                                                                               Table 2 
                                                                     Summary statistics  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the full sample  
 (1) (2) (3)  (3) (5) 
Variables  Mean  25th  Median  75th  Std. Dev 
UE_ORi,t -0.002 -0.083 -0.006 0.068 0.157 
NORi,t 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.026 
TIGHT_ IC_SLACKi,t 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.472 
IC_SLACKi,t 3.031 0.870 1.778 3.535 4.554 
IC_COVi,t 3.443 3.000 3.500 4.000 0.774 
A_CFOi,t 0.015 -0.023 0.009 0.048 0.067 
A_DISXi,t -0.041 -0.137 -0.051 0.052 0.147 
A_PRODi,t 0.017 -0.074 0.033 0.110 0.175 
A_WCAi,t 0.003 -0.044 0.007 0.051 0.115 
CSi,t 0.383 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.487 
DISTi,t-1 3.918 1.140 3.710 6.700 4.872 
LOSSi,t  0.145 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.352 
SIZEi,t 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.472 
Observations   559   
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for firms with tight and loose covenant slack 
 Firms with tight 
covenant slack 
  Firms with loose       
covenant slack 
 Difference in 
Variables  Mean Median  Mean Median    Means  
  (t-test) 
      Medians 
(Wilcoxon test) 
UE_ORi,t -0.023 -0.028  0.008 0.003  ** *** 
NORi,t 0.018 0.006  0.011 0.003   *** *** 
IC_SLACKi,t 0.419 0.611  4.333 2.771   *** *** 
IC_COVi,t 3.465 3.500  3.432 3.250    
A_CFOi,t 0.003 0.002  0.022 0.012  *** *** 
A_DISXi,t -0.037 -0.059  -0.043 -0.049    
A_PRODi,t 0.041 0.051  0.005 0.025  ** *** 
A_WCAi,t 0.005 0.005  0.003 0.009    
CSi,t 0.398 0.000  0.375 0.000    
DISTi,t-1 2.362 1.995  4.693 4.490  *** *** 
LOSSi,t  0.296 0.000  0.070 0.000  ***  
SIZEi,t 0.387 0.000  0.306 0.000                 *  
Observations 186  373    
      Notes  
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. Panels A and B indicate the descriptive 
statistics of the main variables for the full sample and the firms with tight and loose interest coverage covenant 
slack, respectively. UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues. NORi,t is non-operating revenues. 
TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t is equal to one for firms with tight interest coverage covenant slack, and zero otherwise. 
IC_SLACKi,t is the interest coverage covenant slack. IC_COVi,t is the interest coverage covenant threshold. A_ 
CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from operations. A_ DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses. 
A_ PRODi,t is abnormal levels of production costs. A_WCAi,t is abnormal levels of working capital accruals. CSi,t 
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is equal to one for firms that have positive unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items, and 
zero otherwise. DISTi,t-1 is the Taffler Z-score. LOSSi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have losses, and zero 
otherwise. SIZEi,t  is equal to one for firms that have a natural logarithm of sales revenue within the top tercile of 
the full sample, and zero otherwise. ***/**/* indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
                                                                                   Table 3  
                                                                     Pearson correlation matrix  
Variables UE_ORi,t NORi,t    TIGHT_ 
IC_SLACKi,t 
A_CFOi,t A_DISXi,t A_PRODi,t A_WCAi,t    CSi,t DISTi,t-1 LOSSi,t 
UE_ORi,t  
NORi,t -0.197  
TIGHT_ IC_SLACKi,t -0.092  0.125  
A_CFOi,t  0.021  0.021  -0.135  
A_DISXi,t  0.040 -0.051   0.020 -0.053  
A_PRODi,t  0.111  0.024   0.095 -0.316 -0.604  
A_WCAi,t -0.002  0.067   0.008 -0.084  0.013  0.029  
CSi,t -0.109  0.069   0.022 -0.014 -0.104 -0.104  0.008  
DISTi,t-1 -0.036  0.007  -0.226  0.262  0.019 -0.114 -0.155 -0.109  
LOSSi,t -0.083  0.014   0.303 -0.180  0.020  0.046 -0.027  0.188 -0.160  
SIZEi,t  0.012  0.044   0.081 -0.004 -0.053  0.077 -0.012  0.045 -0.072 -0.021 
Notes 
This table shows the Pearson correlations among regression variables for the full sample. UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues. NORi,t is non-operating 
revenues. TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t  is equal to one for firms with tight interest coverage covenant slack, and zero otherwise. A_ CFOi,t is abnormal levels of 
cash flows from operations. A_ DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses. A_ PRODi,t is abnormal levels of production costs. A_WCAi,t is abnormal 
levels of working capital accruals. CSi,t is equal to one for firms that have positive unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items, and zero 
otherwise. DISTi,t-1 is the Taffler Z-score. LOSSi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have losses, and zero otherwise. SIZEi,t  is equal to one for firms that have 
a natural logarithm of sales revenue within the top tercile of the full sample, and zero otherwise. Amounts in bold are significant at 0.05 level.  
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                                                                                       Table 4 
                                     The effect of tight covenant slack on classification shifting of revenues 
Variables  UE_ORi,t 
NORi,t -0.771* 
 (-1.717) 
TIGHT_ IC_SLACKi,t -0.014 
 (-0.671) 
NORi,t × TIGHT_ IC_SLACKi,t   -1.270** 
 (-2.116) 
A_CFOi,t 0.144 
 (0.751) 
NORi,t × A_CFOi,t   7.151** 
 (2.104) 
A_DISXi,t 0.217** 
 (2.453) 
NORi,t × A_DISXi,t  -0.105 
 (-0.039) 
A_PRODi,t 0.203** 
 (2.317) 
NORi,t × A_PRODi,t 4.258** 
 (2.121) 
A_WCAi,t  0.005 
 (0.055) 
NORi,t × A_WCAi,t  -1.066 
 (-0.552) 
CSi,t -0.007 
 (-0.447) 
NORi,t × CSi,t -0.424 
 (-0.716) 
DISTi,t-1 -0.003 
 (-1.357) 
NORi,t × DISTi,t-1 -0.040 
 (-0.661) 
LOSSi,t  -0.021 
 (-0.924) 
NORi,t × LOSSi,t -0.459 
 (-0.698) 
SIZEi,t -0.011 
 (-0.619) 
NORi,t × SIZEi,t 1.254* 
 (1.719) 
Constant 0.052 
 (0.908) 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 559 
F-test 5.62*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.103 
Notes  
This table shows regression results for examining whether firms engage in 
classification shifting of revenues when they have tight interest coverage covenant 
slack. UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues. NORi,t is non-operating revenues. 
TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t  is equal to one for firms with tight interest coverage covenant 
slack, and zero otherwise. A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from operations. 
A_DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses. A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels 
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of production costs. A_WCAi,t is abnormal levels of working capital accruals. CSi,t is 
equal to one for firms that have positive unexpected core earnings and income-
decreasing special items, and zero otherwise. DISTi,t-1 is the Taffler Z-score. LOSSi,t is 
equal to one for firm-years that have losses, and zero otherwise. SIZEi,t  is equal to one 
for firms that have a natural logarithm of sales revenue within the top tercile of the 
full sample, and zero otherwise. t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. ***/**/* indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, 
respectively. 
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                                                                                          Table 5 
                                                               Other EBITDA-related covenant measures  
Variables  UE_ORi,t UE_ORi,t 
NORi,t 0.922*** 0.037 
 (2.736) (0.059) 
EBITDA_ALLi,t 0.031**  
 (2.313)  
NORi,t × EBITDA_ALLi,t -1.566***  
 (-3.603)  
TIGHT_ DE_SLACKi,t  0.005 
  (0.254) 
NORi,t × TIGHT_ DE_SLACKi,t   -1.256** 
  (-2.004) 
A_CFOi,t 0.119 0.131 
 (0.993) (0.650) 
NORi,t × A_CFOi,t   1.291 13.626*** 
 (0.567) (3.346) 
A_DISXi,t 0.184*** 0.205** 
 (3.244) (2.259) 
NORi,t × A_DISXi,t  3.470** 3.788 
 (2.111) (1.009) 
A_PRODi,t 0.124** 0.130 
 (2.314) (1.522) 
NORi,t × A_PRODi,t 4.131*** 10.375*** 
 (2.806) (4.079) 
A_WCAi,t  -0.013 -0.136 
 (-0.293) (-1.426) 
NORi,t × A_WCAi,t  -0.831 5.620** 
 (-0.827) (2.204) 
CSi,t -0.013 -0.011 
 (-1.102) (-0.713) 
NORi,t × CSi,t -0.408 -0.969 
 (-0.882) (-1.481) 
DISTi,t-1 -0.002** -0.002 
 (-2.033) (-0.942) 
NORi,t × DISTi,t-1 -0.026 -0.061 
 (-0.905) (-0.842) 
LOSSi,t  -0.015 -0.027 
 (-0.926) (-1.153) 
NORi,t × LOSSi,t -0.496 -1.035 
 (-0.991) (-1.604) 
SIZEi,t 0.000 0.009 
 (0.026) (0.525) 
NORi,t × SIZEi,t 0.509 0.201 
 (0.833) (0.258) 
Constant 0.064* 0.044 
 (1.710) (0.646) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1,272 502 
F-test 3.81*** 6.34*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.064 0.111 
Notes  
Columns (1) and (2) show regression results for examining whether firms engage in classification shifting 
of revenues when they have only EBITDA-related covenants and tight debt to EBITDA covenant slack, 
respectively. UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues. NORi,t is non-operating revenues. EBITDA_ALL 
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is equal to one for firms that have only EBITDA-related covenants, and zero otherwise. 
TIGHT_DE_SLACKi,t is equal to one for firms with tight debt to EBITDA covenant slack, and zero 
otherwise. A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from operations. A_DISXi,t is abnormal levels of 
discretionary expenses. A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of production costs. A_WCAi,t is abnormal levels of 
working capital accruals. CSi,t is equal to one for firms that have positive unexpected core earnings and 
income-decreasing special items, and zero otherwise. DISTi,t-1 is the Taffler Z-score. LOSSi,t is equal to one 
for firm-years that have losses, and zero otherwise. SIZEi,t  is equal to one for firms that have a natural 
logarithm of sales revenue within the top tercile of the full sample, and zero otherwise. t-statistics (in 
parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***/**/* indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% 
(two tailed) levels, respectively. 
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                                                                                  Table 6 
  Controlling for corporate governance  
Variable  UE_ORi,t 
NORi,t -0.827** 
 (-2.073) 
TIGHT_ IC_SLACKi,t -0.012 
 (-0.561) 
NORi,t × TIGHT_ IC_SLACKi,t   -1.745*** 
 (-2.809) 
AUDCi,t 0.001 
 (0.056) 
NORi,t × AUDCi,t 1.384** 
 (2.458) 
BINDi,t 0.006 
 (0.367) 
NORi,t × BINDi,t  -0.635 
 (-1.247) 
A_CFOi,t 0.136 
 (0.704) 
NORi,t × A_CFOi,t   10.869*** 
 (3.271) 
A_DISXi,t 0.208** 
 (2.386) 
NORi,t × A_DISXi,t  1.655 
 (0.762) 
A_PRODi,t 0.190** 
 (2.248) 
NORi,t × A_PRODi,t 5.475*** 
 (3.150) 
A_WCAi,t  0.013 
 (0.155) 
NORi,t × A_WCAi,t  -2.192 
 (-1.389) 
CSi,t -0.009 
 (-0.593) 
NORi,t × CSi,t -0.319 
 (-0.594) 
DISTi,t-1 -0.003 
 (-1.322) 
NORi,t × DISTi,t-1 -0.071 
 (-1.140) 
LOSSi,t  -0.021 
 (-0.959) 
NORi,t × LOSSi,t -0.357 
 (-0.560) 
SIZEi,t -0.011 
 (-0.614) 
NORi,t × SIZEi,t 1.256* 
 (1.750) 
Constant 0.050 
 (0.850) 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 559 
F-test 8.55*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.108 
                      Notes  
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This table shows regression results for our main analysis after controlling for 
corporate governance. UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues. NORi,t is non-
operating revenues. TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t  is equal to one for firms with tight interest 
coverage covenant slack, and zero otherwise. AUDCi,t is equal to one if the size of the 
audit committee is greater than the sample median and all directors on the audit 
committee are independent, and zero otherwise. BINDi,t is equal to one if the 
percentage of independent board members is more than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from operations. A_DISXi,t is 
abnormal levels of discretionary expenses. A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of 
production costs. A_WCAi,t is abnormal levels of working capital accruals. CSi,t is 
equal to one for firms that have positive unexpected core earnings and income-
decreasing special items, and zero otherwise. DISTi,t-1 is the Taffler Z-score. LOSSi,t is 
equal to one for firm-years that have losses, and zero otherwise. SIZEi,t  is equal to one 
for firms that have a natural logarithm of sales revenue within the top tercile of the 
full sample, and zero otherwise. t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. ***/**/* indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, 
respectively. 
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                                                                                                      Table 7 
                                                                                 Excluding financial crisis period 
Variables  UE_ORi,t 
NORi,t -0.932 
 (-1.498) 
TIGHT_ IC_SLACKi,t 0.020 
 (0.844) 
NORi,t × TIGHT_ IC_SLACKi,t   -1.704** 
 (-2.355) 
A_CFOi,t 0.053 
 (0.240) 
NORi,t × A_CFOi,t   5.077 
 (1.100) 
A_DISXi,t 0.168 
 (1.651) 
NORi,t × A_DISXi,t  -1.838 
 (-0.550) 
A_PRODi,t 0.183* 
 (1.849) 
NORi,t × A_PRODi,t 1.974 
 (0.597) 
A_WCAi,t  -0.026 
 (-0.260) 
NORi,t × A_WCAi,t  1.436 
 (0.589) 
CSi,t -0.003 
 (-0.195) 
NORi,t × CSi,t -0.676 
 (-0.954) 
DISTi,t-1 -0.002 
 (-0.965) 
NORi,t × DISTi,t-1 0.001 
 (0.012) 
LOSSi,t  -0.027 
 (-0.905) 
NORi,t × LOSSi,t -0.343 
 (-0.428) 
SIZEi,t -0.012 
 (-0.597) 
NORi,t × SIZEi,t 1.045 
 (1.404) 
Constant 0.044 
 (0.755) 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 424 
F-test 4.08*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.107 
Notes  
This table shows regression results for our main analysis after excluding financial crisis 
period. UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues. NORi,t is non-operating revenues. 
TIGHT_IC_SLACKi,t  is equal to one for firms with tight interest coverage covenant slack, 
and zero otherwise. A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from operations. A_DISXi,t is 
abnormal levels of discretionary expenses. A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of production costs. 
A_WCAi,t is abnormal levels of working capital accruals. CSi,t is equal to one for firms that 
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have positive unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items, and zero 
otherwise. DISTi,t-1 is the Taffler Z-score. LOSSi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have 
losses, and zero otherwise. SIZEi,t  is equal to one for firms that have a natural logarithm of 
sales revenue within the top tercile of the full sample, and zero otherwise. t-statistics (in 
parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***/**/* indicate significance at 
1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, respectively. 
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                                    Appendix 1. The illustrative format of the income statement 
Sales Revenue 
Operating Revenues – Other  
Cost of Goods Sold  
Gross Profit 
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 
Operating Expense – Other  
EBITDA 
Depreciation of Fixed Assets  
Amortization of Intangibles  
Interest and Related Expense  
Non-operating Revenues 
- Interest and Dividend Income 
- Rental Income 
- Special Items 
Pretax Income 
Income Taxes  
Net Income 
                            Notes  
This table shows the standard format of the income statement used by the 
Compustat Global database.  
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Appendix 2. Other earnings management measures  
Real earnings management  
Following prior research, three measures for real earnings management are employed (e.g. Franz et al. 2014; 
Roychowdhury 2006). These are abnormal levels of cash flows from operations (A_CFO), abnormal levels of 
discretionary expenses (A_DISX), and abnormal levels of production costs (A_PROD). A_CFO, A_DISX, and 
A_PROD are measured as the residuals from the following regressions estimated cross-sectionally for each 
industry-year, respectively: 
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where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations for firm i in year t; ATi,t-1 is total assets; Si,t is sales revenue; DISXi,t is 
discretionary expenses, calculated as the sum of selling, general, and administrative expenses and R&D expenses; 
PRODi,t is production costs, calculated as the sum of cost of sales and change in inventory.  
Accruals earnings management  
Working capital discretionary accruals (A_WCA) are used as a measure for accruals earnings management 
following existing studies (e.g. Dechow and Dichev 2002; Peasnell et al. 2000). A_WCA is measured as the 
residual from the following regression estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year: 
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where WCAi,t is working capital accruals for firm i in year t, calculated as the change in non-cash current assets 
minus the change in current liabilities (net of change in the current portion of long term debt); ATi,t-1 is total assets; 
∆SAi,t is the change in sales revenue minus the change in accounts receivable. 
Classification shifting of expenses 
Extant studies document that if a firm engages in classification shifting of expenses then they are likely to have 
positive unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items (e.g. Fan et al. 2019; Joo and Chamberlain 
2017; McVay 2006). Therefore, we measure expense misclassification using an indicator variable, CS, that is equal 
to one for firms that have positive unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items and zero 
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otherwise where unexpected core earnings are calculated as the residuals from the following regression estimated 
cross-sectionally for each industry-year: 
         =	, =  ! + #$=	,$ + #%)>	, + #'?	,$ + #+?	, + #,∆@	,+#/A=B_∆@	, + -	,                             
where CEi.t is core earnings for firm i in year t scaled by sales revenue where the former is defined as sales revenue 
minus cost of sales minus selling, general and administrative expenses; ATOi,t is asset turnover ratio, calculated 
as sales revenue over average net operating assets; ACCRi,t is accruals, defined as the difference between net 
income before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations divided by sales revenue; ∆PSi,t is percentage 
change in sales revenue; NEG_∆PSi,t is percentage change in sales revenue if it is less than zero, and zero 
otherwise. 
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